The Indian Navy Has a Big Problem: The Subsurface Dilemma

The United States’ strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific has been accompanied by a heightened interest in matters maritime. In contrast to the primary theaters of the Cold War, the region’s strategic and economic geography is strongly defined by its wide oceans, narrow choke points and contested waterways. As a result, the naval profiles of Asia’s two great rising powers, India and China, have attracted a hitherto unprecedented level of attention.

Meanwhile, the very nature of maritime competition appears to be undergoing a radical transformation. The proliferation of precision-guided weaponry has resulted in the erection of increasingly formidable land-based reconnaissance-strike complexes, structured around dense constellations of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) complexes. The growing ability of coastal states to both locate and prosecute mobile targets offshore has raised questions over the survivability of expensive, high-signature surface vessels, and maritime competition is increasingly being driven underwater. While much commentary has been made on the drivers and motivations behind China’s growing submarine fleet, the Indian Navy’s perception of the undersea domain has only infrequently been discussed. How do security managers in New Delhi view issues such as undersea warfare or the future of subsurface competition in the Indian Ocean? What are the Indian Navy’s priorities in terms of subsurface force structure and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)? How close is it to realizing its stated objectives? And what kind of acquisitions could best help the Indian Navy shield its fleet and maritime environs from unwelcome submarine activity?

Since its inception, the Indian Navy has been a carrier-centric force with a service culture heavily geared toward blue-water operations, surface warfare and sea control. India’s 2009 Maritime Doctrine clearly reflects these organizational proclivities, stipulating that “[s]ea control is the central concept around which the [Indian Navy] is structured, and aircraft carriers are decidedly the most substantial contributors to it.” With rare exceptions, Indian Navy chiefs have been surface warfare officers or naval aviators.

Nevertheless, Indian naval planners have long had a strong appreciation of the risks posed by marauding enemy submarines and the advantages to be derived from using subsurface assets for forward-deployed sea denial and choke point–control. The sinking of an Indian frigate, the INS Khukri, by a Pakistani Daphne-class submarine in the war of 1971, features amongst the Indian Navy’s darkest hours, and security managers in Delhi have traditionally harbored a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the Indian Ocean, fretting over underwater encroachments. Whereas during the Cold War, Indian strategists pointed to the mushrooming of U.S. submarine pens in Diego Garcia, nowadays concerns revolve more around China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean.


India’s Dwindling Conventional Submarine Force::

Since 1999, the Indian Navy has repeatedly stated that it would require at least twenty-four conventional submarines in order to both prevail in a high-intensity conflict with Pakistan and deter extra-regional powers. This force structure has been sanctioned by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and was reportedly reiterated in the most recent version of the Indian Navy’s classified Maritime Capability Perspective Plan.

Unfortunately, after a series of accidents and cascading delays, the Indian Navy’s submarine flotilla has shrunk down to only eleven operational boats—seven Russian Kilo-class submarines and four German HDW submarines. No new diesel-electric submarine has been commissioned for the past fifteen years, and many of the existing boats are over a quarter-century old. In October 2005, the Indian Navy signed a landmark deal for six French Scorpene-class boats. All submarines were to be built in India, at Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, under a technology-transfer agreement. For a variety of reasons ranging from reported teething problems in the absorption of new technologies, to abstruse and never-ending pricing negotiations, the schedule for delivery has been repeatedly pushed back. Indeed, whereas the Scorpenes were initially projected to join the fleet between 2012 and 2017, it now only looks as though they will be battle-ready by 2022. Project 75I, a follow-on program for six next-generation SSKs equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) and land-attack capabilities, was only just cleared by India’s Defense Acquisition Council, after years of increasingly desperate appeals by India’s naval officers to fast-track the process. Initially, the plan was to import two boats once a foreign vendor had been selected, then license-build the remaining four, but it now looks as though the Indian Navy has opted to construct all six boats in India with foreign assistance. It will probably take a few years to select the vendor, then another eight to ten years to build the submarines in question, rendering the prospect of them joining the fleet before 2030 extremely unlikely.


India’s Naval Nuclear Ambitions::

In parallel to its conventional submarine fleet, India has been investing in nuclear-powered platforms. In 2012, the Indian Navy commissioned the INS Chakra, an Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), which it acquired from Russia on a ten-year lease. When it was commissioned, it was described as a potential force multiplier for India’s rapidly decaying submarine fleet, and as opening the door in the future for blue-water submarine operations. Whereas India’s diesel-electric submarine fleet is primarily located along its western coast, the INS Chakra has been stationed along its eastern seaboard—and is clearly positioned to address the Chinese threat. There have been persistent rumors of plans to lease a second Akula, although nothing has yet been officially confirmed.

The most significant development with respect to India’s submarine force occurred in 2009, when India launched its first indigenously developed SSBN, the INS Arihant. The Arihant’s reactor went critical in August 2013, and it is expected to formally join the fleet some time in 2015. At present, it is slated to be fitted with up to twelve 750-km range Sagarika K-15 SLBMs, which is considered by many Indian commentators to be “grossly inadequate." Due to these range limitations and the short refueling cycle of the boat’s nuclear reactor, it is unlikely that the Arihant will deploy on deterrent patrols any time soon, and should thus be viewed—for the time being, at least—as something of a test platform and technology demonstrator, rather than as a viable, rugged component of India’s deterrence structure. This may change in the future, however, as India continues to develop longer-range SLBMs, such as the K-4, which has an advertised range of 3,500 km, or the K-5, which is still in the design phase and projected to have a range of 5,000 km.

New Delhi is cognizant of the fact that in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent, particularly vis-a-vis China, whose strategic centers are located along its eastern seaboard, it will need to develop larger SSBNs with greater missile-carriage capacity and more powerful reactors. The development of a sea-based deterrent constitutes a colossal new undertaking for the Indian Navy, whether in terms of technological development, supporting infrastructure or even in terms of nuclear doctrine and command and control arrangements. Under the aegis of Project Varsha, a large new SSBN base is being built in Rambilli, 50 km southwest of the eastern port of Visakhapatnam, and an Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) communications station was recently erected next to India’s Very Low Frequency (VLF) station in Tamil Nadu. India aims to eventually acquire a SSBN fleet of four to five indigenously produced vessels, all of which will most likely be based along its eastern seaboard. This is primarily due to the fact that the Bay of Bengal is deemed a great degree more suitable for nuclear submarine operations—and perhaps in the future for SSBN bastion development—than the shallow and congested waters of the Arabian Sea.


India’s Perception of the Undersea Domain::

India’s concerns with regard to the undersea domain are twofold. The first, more immediate concern is Pakistan, which currently operates five SSKs, three Agosta-90B submarines and two more antiquated Agosta-70 boats, along with three Cosmos-class midget submarines. Unlike India’s conventional submarines, Pakistan’s Agosta-90Bs are equipped with AIP, and senior Pakistani defense officials have intimated that Islamabad could soon conclude a long-discussed deal to procure six additional SSKs from China. Pakistani naval planners have traditionally focused on offensive sea denial and coastal interdiction. Indeed, as one former Pakistani chief of naval staff noted, “Submarines have all along been [Pakistan’s] main strength and at the heart of our naval strategy of offensive sea denial.”

For the Indian Navy, acquiring and preserving the ability to successfully establish localized sea control within cluttered and bathymetrically challenging waters is of critical importance. If India can no longer credibly threaten Pakistan’s sea lines of communication or operate within strike range of Pakistan’s major ports, it will lose its capacity to translate its naval superiority into effective coercive power. New Delhi would find itself deprived of one of its few viable options to impose costs on Pakistan, and India’s ability to dissuade Pakistani acts of subconventional provocation would find itself further reduced. An addition of another six submarines to Pakistan’s inventory could severely impede India’s ability to exert sea control along Pakistan’s Makran Coast. India’s surface fleet might experience difficulty in locating and prosecuting Pakistani diesel-electric and midget submarines, particularly if they chose to “bottom” and evade sonar detection by settling on a shallow seafloor, switching off their engines, and closing their seawater inlets. Even the hypothetical presence of such platforms deployed along Pakistan’s coastline could create a “subsurface threat-in-being” for the Indian Navy and discourage it from deploying some of its more valuable assets.

In the future, the Indian Navy might consider developing a more distributed undersea battle network, composed of smart mines, midget submarines, sensors and UUVs (unmanned underwater vehicles), in addition to larger submarines, in order to help reconnoiter, and, if necessary, sanitize contested undersea environments. UUVs, in particular, are likely to fulfill an increasingly wide spectrum of tasks, ranging from mine warfare (MIW), to underwater intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), and ASW. There have been reports that India intends to acquire up to six 150-ton midget submarines for its special ops MARCOS unit, as well as up to ten indigenously developed UUVs for littoral surveillance purposes. These are steps in the right direction.

India’s more long-term concern is related to Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean. Since December 2008, China has regularly rotated naval task forces in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for anti-piracy missions. Indian observers, however, have expressed concern over the second-order effects of such deployments, noting that they have allowed Chinese naval intelligence units to better survey the Indian Ocean’s underwater topography and record bathymetric conditions. Similarly, Beijing also signed a contract allowing it to explore polymetallic sulphide ore deposits over a 10,000 square-kilometer swath of the Southwest Indian Ocean’s seabed. This has been perceived by India’s Directorate of Naval Intelligence as an excuse for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to map the region’s notoriously challenging undersea terrain, with future submarine operations in mind. In 2013, the Indian press leaked the findings of a classified Indian Defense Ministry report, which allegedly reported that Chinese nuclear submarines were “making frequent forays into the Indian Ocean.” These assertions have been partially confirmed by Lt. General Michael Flynn, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, who declared in February 2014 that China had “recently deployed for the first time a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the Indian Ocean.”

More recently, a Song-class SSK berthed in the Sri Lankan port of Colombo before heading out for escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. In the past, Indian naval officers had repeatedly asserted that the forward deployment of Chinese submarines—and particularly of Chinese SSNs—in the Indian Ocean would be cause for grave concern. Now that Beijing’s subsurface penetration of the Indian Ocean has been confirmed, it will be interesting to see how the Indian Navy chooses to respond to what, no doubt, constitutes an unwelcome new strategic reality.


The Importance of the P-8I::

India’s acquisition of eight Boeing P-8I (Poseidon) Neptune Aircraft—with an option for four more—constitutes perhaps one of the most encouraging developments, as it will significantly enhance the Indian Navy’s ability to conduct long-range maritime reconnaissance and ASW. The Poseidon’s Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) will also allow the Indian Navy to more easily detect diesel-electric submarines’ periscopes—a critical factor when addressing the Pakistani submarine threat. Presently based at Rajali, in Tamil Nadu, India’s P-8Is will eventually be deployed to India’s Eastern Naval Command. With a mission radius of 600 nautical miles for six hours on station and up to 1,200 nautical miles for four hours on station, India’s P-8Is will allow the Indian Navy to greatly enhance its maritime and littoral surveillance capabilities over the Bay of Bengal, as well as its ability for maritime interdiction and ASW.

There are concerns, however, over the security of the P-8I’s communications, as well as over its lack of electronic warfare self-protection abilities. Indeed, due to India’s continued refusal to sign the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), the P-8I was delivered without secure and encrypted communications, and satellite navigational aids. As a result, India’s P-8Is are slated to be equipped with an indigenously developed communications system, the Data Link-II system, whose reliability and effectiveness have been openly questioned by some Indian naval officers.


The Damaging Effects of Bureaucratic Dysfunction::

India’s growing challenges in the undersea domain are exacerbated by certain glaring capability gaps in its surface fleet’s ability to conduct deep-water ASW (anti-submarine warfare). As of now, India’s major surface combatants are only equipped with hull-mounted sonars. While observers have commented on the efficacy of these indigenously developed sonars in the higher thermoclines of the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy urgently requires new types of sonar in order to effectively address the growing threat posed by both nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. Active variable depth sonars (VDS) will be required to better monitor the movements of quiet diesel-electric submarines, while passive towed arrays will be needed to effectively detect the noise emitted by nuclear power plant machinery. Going forward, the best approach for the Indian Navy might be to pursue a VDS so as to address the diesel threat, and a multifunction towed array in order to both listen for the returns from the active VDS, and the noise continuously radiated by lurking nuclear submarines. In short, acquiring a multifunction towed array would allow Indian surface ship commanders the operational flexibility to choose to remain silent and simply listen for the sounds of enemy submarines, or to “ping” active to bounce sound off the hulls of any subsurface intruders.

These hardware deficiencies can be attributed, as often in India, to the dysfunctional state of the nation’s higher defense management. Even though the Indian Navy has been trying to import advanced towed arrays for its ships since the 1990s, the Indian Ministry of Defense has, until recently, repeatedly blocked these attempts in favor of mostly fruitless indigenous efforts, such as the Nagan. There are indications that this bureaucratic obstructionism may soon dissipate, but it will take some time before India’s frigates and destroyers are equipped with more advanced sonar systems. Concerns over the vulnerability of India’s surface ships to subsurface attack have been compounded by the fact that the Indian Navy now suffers from an acute shortage in ASW helicopters. Indeed, it currently has only eleven aging Kamov-28 and seventeen Sea King helicopters to help screen a fleet of over 130 boats. Once again, the Indian Navy’s requests to move ahead with a contract for longer-range, and better equipped, helicopters have been met with an unsavory mixture of bureaucratic incompetence and political diffidence.

Earlier this year, India’s naval chief, Admiral DK Joshi, resigned after a series of dramatic accidents, two of which took place aboard SSKs and—in both cases—led to a tragic loss of life. In the course of a recent and much discussed interview, the embittered admiral deplored the difficulties he had experienced in obtaining timely repairs and refits of his vessels and drew attention to what he perceived as forming the true cause of India’s continued military dysfunction:

“The root cause is this dysfunctional and inefficient business model that we have (…) While professional competence, accountability and responsibility is with the service, this is not the case with authority. (…) For example, when it comes to changing submarine batteries, which are available indigenously, or commencing refits and repairs of ships, aircraft, submarines in Indian yards, the service (navy) does not have that empowerment. (….) Where there is authority, there is no accountability. And where there is responsibility, there is no authority.”

Until these larger structural and institutional issues are addressed, it would appear that—notwithstanding India’s beleaguered naval officers’ best efforts—the nation’s subsurface challenges are likely to grow, rather than diminish.


India must acquire surveillance capacity to monitor both sides of the border

New Delhi: Defence analyst Commodore (retired) C Uday Bhaskar on Monday said that the bomb blast which took place near the Wagah border in Pakistan poses a very serious internal security challenge for Pakistan, adding that India would have to acquire the capacity for surveillance on both sides of the border.

"The suicide attack at the Wagah border is a very serious internal security challenge for Pakistan. The fact that the suicide bomber could enter the area despite the security calls for a certain degree of internal review by the Pakistani agencies," Commodore Bhaskar told ANI here.

Commodore Bhaskar further said that the activities of terrorist groups in Pakistan call for deep introspection, both within India and Pakistan.

"The internal security of Pakistan has been challenged by the Pakistani Taliban and its various support groups. This particular incident has many elements that should call for deep introspection both within Pakistan and India which is directly affected by any development that takes place near the Wagah border," he said.

He further said that since the incident took place close to the border, India must develop its surveillance capabilities to keep an eye on both sides of the border.

"For us the cause for concern is the fact that the incident took place so close to the Wagah border, which means that there is a probability that the same kind of attack can take place on the Indian side or along the border. India would have to acquire the capacity for surveillance not only on its side of the border but on the other side of the border as well," he said.

Earlier on Sunday, a reported 55 people, including three security personnel, were reportedly killed and nearly 200 injured when a suicide attacker detonated a powerful bomb at Wagah in Pakistan, just after the flag-lowering ceremony at the border crossing.

Source:  zeenews.india.com/

India Special Forces Kick off Anti-terror Exercises in Lanka

Ignoring resistance from the political leadership in Tamil Nadu, a contingent of elite special forces of the Indian Army landed in Colombo on Monday to share their expertise in handling counter-insurgency operations.

According to a Defence Ministry official, a contingent of 42 special forces troops landed in Lanka to launch the military training exercise ‘Mitra Shakti’ to be held at Uva-Kudaoyo Commando Regiment training school. In the three-week session, the Army will share military warfare expertise with its Lankan counterparts.

“The special forces troops will participate in a training programme on November 3-23 and carry out counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism training under the UN mandate,” said an official.

Sources claim that a similar military training exercise was deferred three times on earlier occasions, in the last three months, partly due to pressure from regional political parties and partly due to mutually consented availability of dates.

Mitra Shakti, an initiative designed largely by the Army, is the successful outcome of the ‘Annual Defence Dialogue’ that was co-chaired in Colombo earlier in October.

As many as 168 personnel from the Lankan Army special forces and Commando regiment and 32 from Lankan Navy and Air Force will take part.

Though the schedule for this joint exercise was fixed earlier, it coincides with the docking of two conventional submarines of the Chinese Navy in Colombo port three days ago, much to the consternation of the Indian establishment.

The modalities for the three-week long exercise were covered in a Memorandum of Understanding signed earlier.

Meanwhile, in view of the increasing influence of China and Pakistan in Sri Lanka, New Delhi is beefing up its military presence at its High Commission in Colombo.

For the first time, an Army officer has been recently appointed in the Indian High Commission in Lanka.

India Calls for International Action to Strengthen Nuclear Security




Recognising the threat of nuclear terrorism, India has called for effective international cooperation and responsible action by governments to strengthen nuclear security and prevent non-state actors from acquiring vulnerable atomic material. 

"There is widespread recognition that the threat of nuclear terrorism is one of the pressing challenges facing the international community. Responsible national action and effective international cooperation are therefore required for strengthening nuclear security to prevent vulnerable nuclear material falling into hands of non-state actors," First Secretary in the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Abhishek Singh said. 

Singh, in a statement on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the UN General Assembly here yesterday, said India has consistently supported IAEA's important role in facilitating national efforts to strengthen nuclear security and in fostering effective international cooperation. 

He said as part of implementation of the arrangement with the IAEA concerning India's voluntary contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund, the services of Indian cost-free expert in information security are being provided to the Division of Nuclear Security of the IAEA. 

Singh noted that the universal adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and early entry into force of its 2005 Amendment would go a long way in strengthening global efforts in the area of nuclear security. 

The amended Convention would make it legally binding for states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. 


Singh said India is party to the CPPNM and is amongst the countries which have ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention. 

Singh emphasised that India's commitment to harnessing the benefits of nuclear energy for electricity production while according the highest priority to nuclear safety and security. 

"India will need to rapidly raise the energy production to meet its growing energy requirements to achieve its developmental goals. Nuclear energy is an essential component of our energy basket," he said. 

Underscoring India's commitment to implementing the highest standards for safety of its nuclear power plants and associated fuel cycle facilities, Singh said India will continue to participate and assist the IAEA Secretariat in its endeavour to enhance nuclear safety through the cluster of measures it has formulated in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. 

Singh said the agency has an important role in allaying misapprehensions in the public and member states about the safety of nuclear power plants taking into account the current advances in relevant design and technology areas. 

As part of India's commitment to implement the highest standards for the safety of Indian nuclear power plants, several steps have been taken to organise peer reviews at national and international level, Singh said adding that a "follow up mission" of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) to India for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) units took place in February this year. 

Singh stressed the crucial role nuclear energy plays in achieving the objectives of India's sustainable economic growth. 


He said the country is at the same time extensively engaged in development of nuclear technologies in diverse fields extending beyond nuclear power, including isotope applications for improved crop varieties, crop protection and post-harvest technologies, radio-isotope applications for diagnostic and therapeutic uses in health care and technologies for safe drinking water. 

Singh noted the importance attached by India to IAEA's work in the fields of nuclear science. 

"We contribute to these activities through participation in the Technical Meetings and coordinated Research Projects and also support the IAEA's programme in nuclear fusion," he said. 

Singh said the agency's programme and achievements in relation to nuclear applications in food and agriculture, human health and nutrition, water resources management, protection of the environment and industry make a valuable contribution to meeting the needs of the developing countries. 
"India is highly appreciative of the IAEA's efforts in cancer management, and in particular the Programme on Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). India would continue to support agency activities in these areas, including by offering service of experts and training fellows in reputable institutions in the country," he said. 

Singh told the UN General Assembly that the first unit of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, which achieved its first criticality in July last year, is now operating at close to its full rated power of 1000 MWe. 

The second unit is in an advanced stage of commissioning and construction of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is nearing completion at Kalpakkam and is expected to achieve first criticality in the next six months, Singh said. 


Kolkata Port Under Terror Threat

Kolkata: Patrolling has been intensified at the Kolkata Port Trust following inputs of threat perception at the port and its installations, reports suggested on Tuesday.

The terror alert was reportedly received on Monday night after a couple of intercepts suggested that Kolkata Port was under threat of terror attack.

After a meeting with all stakeholders yesterday, West Bengal government, Coast Guard, CISF, Navy and Army, it was decided to sanitise the port.

Also, INS Khukri and INS Sumitra have been sent to undisclosed location after intelligence intercepts said that there were threats of attack on Navy warships as well.

The Indian Navy warships had docked at Kolkata for Navy week celebrations but now have gone back to sea.

They were scheduled to be anchored in Kolkata till Friday. They were to be opened to the public on Wednesday and Thursday this week.

The Coast Guard has reportedly been told to intensify sea patrolling and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) has been asked to enhance patrolling at the various installations and sensitive points at the port.

Also the local police have been asked to be vigilant at Kolkata and Haldia.

Kolkata Port Trust is India's only riverine port and was set up in 1870.

Kolkata Port Trust has two systems — the Kolkata Dock System and the Haldia Dock Complex.


India, Pakistan Spar Over Kashmir At UNGA

Sparring over Kashmir at the UN general assembly, India and Pakistan have again exchanged verbal volleys over the issue with the Indian delegate dubbing the remarks of his Pakistani counterpart as 'unsolicited comments' that were 'factually incorrect'.

According to a summary on the UN website of a meeting in the general assembly's Third Committee that deals with social, humanitarian and cultural issues, Pakistani delegate Diyar Khan raised the issue of Kashmir by saying that he regretted that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had been "deprived of their right to self-determination." 

Participating in the session on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and right to self-determination, Khan said the right to self-determination must be exercised in an environment free from coercion or duress, as electoral processes held in situations of foreign occupation or alien domination did not reflect people's true wishes.

He said self-determination did not lapse with the passage of time and neither could it be "set aside" by charges of terrorism.



Indian delegate Mayank Joshi stressed that Pakistan's "unsolicited comments" pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir were "factually incorrect", according to the meeting's summary.

He said free, fair and open elections were regularly held in that territory at all levels.

Joshi said India was a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society, fully committed to the goal of eliminating all forms of discrimination.

Exercising the Right of Reply, the Pakistani representative said that the Indian delegation had "alleged" that Jammu and Kashmir was part of India.

He refuted this assertion made by India saying that the UN Security Council had adopted several resolutions declaring Jammu and Kashmir as a "disputed territory".

Khan claimed that the elections in Jammu and Kashmir had been rejected by the United Nations and the Kashmiri people.

Resolutions had clarified that no electoral exercise conducted by the Indian authorities could be a substitute for a free plebiscite held by the United Nations, he said.

Speaking in the exercise of the right of reply, the Indian representative said the elections in Jammu and Kashmir had been held under the scrutiny of international media which had not faulted those elections.

Taking the floor for a second time, the representative of Pakistan said the elections held under foreign occupation could not be a substitute to impartial elections.

Joshi noted that the references of Pakistani delegation were out of context.

Source:  www.hindustantimes.com/

INS Arihant's sea trials by year-end : Nuclear Reactor close to 100% Power

In a major boost to indigenisation of defence manufacturing, India's first nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarine INS Arihant will head out for sea trials by the year-end.

"INS Arihant will be ready for sea trials by the end of this year," an official aware of the developments relating to the 6,000-tonne submarine told IANS, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Once the trials are through and the submarine enters service, India will not only complete its nuclear triad of delivering nuclear weapons from land, sea and air, but also join an elite club of six nations that operate nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles. The US, Russia, France, Britain and China are the other nations with this capability.

The INS Arihant's miniaturised nuclear reactor, built with Russian help, had gone critical last year and the vessel has been going through a series of harbour trials since then at Visakhapatnam, where it is being built.



The submarine has also been going through the power-up cycle of its nuclear reactor and has now achieved a nearly 100 percent power level, the official said.

"Its reactor had gone critical last year. We are now close to attaining 100 percent its power," the official said, adding: "The nuclear reaction is highly controlled. It is something similar to nuclear power plants, but extra caution is needed. The reactor is now functioning perfectly well," the official said.

Once the submarine attains 100 percent power, it will head out to sea for its final trials, which will include the firing of the indigenous Bo5 missile that has a 700-km range and can carry a one tonne nuclear warhead. INS Arihant can carry 12 such missiles.

The vessel, the lead ship of the Arihant-class submarines, was launched in 2009. Its design is based on the Russian Akula-1 class submarines and its 83MW pressurised heavy water reactor has been built with significant Russian assistance.

While its 100-member crew has been trained by Russian specialists, Indian scientists at Mumbai's Bhabha Atomic Research Centre have received significant expertise in reducing the size of the reactor to help it fit into the 10 metre diameter hull of the submarine.

The Indian Navy currently operates the INS Chakra nuclear-powered submarine leased for 10 years from Russia in 2012.

Nuclear submarines stay out at sea for longer periods than diesel-electric powered boats and can also remain under water for longer durations. Conventional submarines have to surface at regular intervals for re-charging their batteries, making them vulnerable to detection.

Two other vessels of the Arihant class are also believed to be under construction at Visakhapatnam's state-owned Hindustan Shipyard Limited.

Source:  www.business-standard.com

50 killed in suicide blast at Wagah border : Indian side not affected



WAGAH BORDER (PAKISTAN): At least 52 Pakistani, including children and security personnel, were killed and about 200 others injured in a powerful suicide blast in Pakistan at Wagah today, minutes after the popular flag- lowering ceremony at the main Indo-Pak land border crossing. 

Officials said that it was suicide attack and at least 52 people had been killed and 200 had sustained injuries. 



"A large number of people were returning after watching Rangers flag ceremony at Wagah border when a suicide bomber blew himself up near one of the exit gates," Inspector General Police of Punjab Police Mushtaq Sukhera said. He said three Pakistan Rangers personnel were also among the dead. 

To a question about security arrangements, Sukhera said, "The Rangers had made stringent security measures but it was difficult to check suicide bomber". 

The al-Qaeda affiliated group Jandullah has claimed responsibility for the attack, according to a news report. 

Huge crowds gather every evening at the crossing, 22 kilometres from Lahore, to watch a "lowering of the flags" ceremony and witness the energetic display of military pageantry that accompanies the formal closing of the border post which soldiers from both countries have conducted for decades. 

Earlier reports had said it could be a cylinder blast. In the wake of Muharram, the police had made strict security measures. 



"We had reports that some banned outfits might target Shias, religious personalities, public processions and important buildings," Sukhera said. 

He said, "Our teams have confirmed that it was a suicide blast". The IG said that the suicide bomber was stopped at the gate of the parade ground at the border and detonated the bomb right when people gathered near the gate. 

"Up to five kilogrammes of explosive material was used in the blast," Sukhera said. 

"The bomb exploded outside a restaurant near a Pakistani paramilitary soldiers' checkpoint at Wagah border," he added. "People were returning after watching the parade at Wagah border when the blast took place. Ball bearings were found at the scene," another police official said. 

Indian side not affected by blast at border ::
The Indian side of the main border crossing between Pakistan and India was not affected by a suicide bomb that killed at least 50 people on the Pakistani side, border security authorities said. 

Ashok Kumar, inspector general of Border Security Force, said the blast took place 500 meters from the Wagah border at about 6:15 PM local time. 

"Our side is safe, we are alert, have increased our security, we are in constant touch with district officials and state police," Kumar said. 

Source:  economictimes.indiatimes.com/

Indian-built Scorpene to carry critical DRDO system

India’s defence establishment will be fully responsible for a DRDO-developed critical propulsion system that will go into the last two of the six Scorpene submarines being built under technology transfer at Mazagon Dock, Mumbai, say the original makers of the submarine.

The system, called air-independent propulsion (AIP), enhances the underwater endurance of conventional (diesel-electric) submarines. Without it, they are forced to surface to periscope depth to recharge their batteries — a position where they are most susceptible to detection — at more frequent intervals.

The French defence shipbuilding major DCNS has put its own second-generation hydrogen fuel cell AIP system on the block. It maintains that the DRDO will be “fully responsible for the process” of the AIP it is developing for fitment on the submarines.

Refusing to entertain queries on the performance parameters and safety of the DRDO’s phosphoric acid fuel cell AIP, which sources told The Hindu would be ready for trials next February, Philippe Berger, former submariner and submarines operational marketing manager of DCNS, said while the company’s first-generation Mesma AIP, powering Pakistan’s Agosta 90B submarines, offered a dived endurance of two weeks, its advanced fuel cell AIP enhanced it to three weeks. 

“Without AIP, Scorpenes can stay underwater for four days,” he said. “Our scheme is limited to integrating safely the DRDO-developed AIP plug to the submarine. We are working on designing the hull section in detail for this,” Mr. Berger told Indian journalists at the DCNS facility, which houses the “fully tested operational-scale fuel cell AIP.”


Source:  www.thehindu.com/

Time to bury Article 370




Prime Minister Narendra Modi has called for public debate on Article 370 and not for it being struck down as such. A decision on this controversial issue should be taken through a democratic process.




We need to discuss the origin and history of Article 370. All the 555 Princely States in India and the seven in Pakistan joined their respective Dominion after Partition. They, word by word, signed the same Instrument of Accession drafted before Independence. Kashmir was the only state in which accession became conditional. The state’s accession was limited to only defence, foreign relations, communications and currency. The rulers of Princely States were required to decide to which Dominion their state would accede. 

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not stipulate for the people of the state to have any say in the matter. Muhammad Ali Jinnah supported this. His hidden agenda was to acquire Hyderabad, the richest and the largest Princely State of the size of France, and some other Princely States with Muslim rulers, like Bhopal. The Indian National Congress before Independence wanted the people of the state rather than the ruler to decide the future status of the state. Jinnah hoped Pakistan would get both Hyderabad and Kashmir, the former on legal grounds, and Kashmir, due to geographical compulsions, would fall like a ripe plum into his lap.

Maharaja Hari Singh had a Hobson’s choice. He realised that being a Hindu, he would have no future in Pakistan. He also realised that if he acceded to India, his future would be no different. He had detained Jawaharlal Nehru at the border, preventing him from entering the state to defend his friend, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, facing trial in a court of law. He vacillated and toyed with the idea of becoming an independent ruler. Impatient at the delay in the maharaja taking a decision, Jinnah ordered an invasion of Kashmir on October 22, 1947, led by Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army. The invading force comprised thousands of tribal Lashkars and Pakistan Army personnel in civvies. Overcoming brave resistance of meagre state forces, the enemy reached Baramulla on October 25. Srinagar was now defenceless. 




Maharaja Hari Singh fled to Jammu. It was in these circumstances that the maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, on the afternoon of October 26, 1947. He was like a drowning man needing immediate succour and in no position to lay down conditions for his accession of the state. No other ruler had signed the Instrument of Accession when he was in such a desperate position. Yet in his letter to Lord Mountbatten he stated that his accession would be confined to defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency only. He also stated that he would immediately hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah, his bitter opponent who had launched the Quit Kashmir movement against him. He knew that unless he did so Nehru would not accept his accession. As for making the accession conditional, he had no axe to grind.

During that critical period Sheikh Abdullah was staying with Nehru in Delhi. Possibly the Sheikh exploited his close friendship with a trusting, visionary and idealistic friend. Jawaharlal and the Congress had lost the war for secularism when undivided India was partitioned. Nehru now hoped to win the battle for secularism in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah came out in his true colours in 1953 when he was found negotiating with the US ambassador in India to have an independent Kashmir. He had to be dismissed and held in detention for several years.

Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the principal drafter of our Constitution, refused to draft any special concessions for Kashmir without the latter fully reciprocating. He told Sheikh Abdullah, “I, as the law minister of India, will never do it.” Nehru then commissioned N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar to draft a special Article for Kashmir. He said there were ongoing military operations in Kashmir and the issue had been referred to the United Nations and, hence, special provisions were necessary for Kashmir. 

Accordingly Ayyangar drafted Article 370 and persuaded Ambedkar and Sardar Patel not to raise any objection. Sheikh Abdullah took full advantage of Article 370 to impose various conditions. Indians visiting Kashmir had to take a permit from their district magistrate. This was almost like getting a visa to go to a foreign country. The Indian national flag was not to be flown in Kashmir and no Indian could buy immovable property in Kashmir although Kashmiris could do so in the rest of India. Even the 30,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees coming out of West Pakistan to Jammu area were not given full citizenship. They cannot vote in state elections, acquire immovable property or get government service in the state or their children admission in state government technical colleges.

These erstwhile refugees have now become over one lakh and they are still virtually stateless citizens. On the other hand, Tibetan Muslim refugees, who came to Srinagar in 1950 when China occupied Tibet, were given full-fledged Indian citizenship. After the martyrdom of Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee in mysterious circumstances in 1953, the pernicious permit system was revoked and the Indian national flag allowed to fly in the state along with the state flag. After Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed in 1953, his successor, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, agreed to several amendments to Article 370 following the prescribed procedure. The jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Comptroller and Auditor General were extended to Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Kashmir was re-designated chief minister, as in other Indian states. The Sadr-e-Riyasat was also re-designated as governor to be appointed by the Central government.

Article 370 was a temporary measure included in our Constitution. It was something primarily concerning the people of Kashmir only. Today the secular brigade, through its policy of appeasement for vote-bank considerations, has made Article 370 a national issue of grave concern for all Indian Muslims.

Hitherto all discussion of the Kashmir problem has been focused both nationally and internationally on Kashmiri-speaking Muslims and ignoring other Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs. The separatists in the state are mostly Kashmiri-speaking Muslims. Very few non-Kashmiri-speaking Muslims have taken to terrorism or separatism. Gujjars, Bakharwals, Shia Muslims of Kargil and, of course, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists have nothing to do with these two maladies afflicting the state. Kashmiri-speaking Muslims constitute about 45 per cent of the population of the state residing in only 10 per cent of the land space in Indian-administered Kashmir. State Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir are being held in November 2014. The BJP seems to have got some foothold even in the Valley. If at any stage now or later the BJP attains its 44-plus target in the Assembly, Article 370 could be given a fitting burial by a suitable resolution passed by the state Assembly. 

This could happen in 2014-15 or after the next Assembly elections in the state, when the BJP has established its credentials in the Valley through good governance. That would be the best way of throwing Article 370 into the dustbin of history.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir

Source:  www.asianage.com

India-Pakistan Relations: A Destructive Equilibrium

The seven-decade rivalry between India and Pakistan is often portrayed as intractable – with good reason. The countries were birthed out of a bloody partition that encouraged each to define itself in opposition to the other, and they have fought four wars since.

Even during peacetime, tensions are high. This year, though, encouraging overtures by newly elected prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi led some observers to cautiously hope that the two countries would step up cooperation on trade, energy, humanitarian, and environmental issues.

Unfortunately, other actors, most notably the Pakistani defense establishment and its terrorist proxies, are derailing the process. There are two reasons. First, they see further cooperation and integration between India and Pakistan as putting off negotiations to settle the Kashmir issue. Second, from a broader perspective, closer relations between India and Pakistan would undermine the perception, held by a substantial portion of the Pakistani public, that India poses an existential threat to Pakistan. Both the military and terrorists would lose their raison d’être if this were to occur.

Thus, a destructive equilibrium has emerged, in which both cooperative overtures and displays of deterrence by the Indian government have the potential to lead to a further deterioration of Indian and Pakistani relations. However, a new and more cooperative equilibrium could be achieved if India and reconciliatory elements within Pakistan’s government were able to establish patterns of cooperation on non-securitized issues, and prevent those issues from becoming securitized.

How did India and Pakistan arrive at this equilibrium? The answer starts, of course, in Kashmir, which has always been the primary point of contention between the two countries. Unfortunately, the Kashmir question is unlikely to be answered soon. While territorial disputes between states are usually bitter and persistent – states usually perceive competition over territory as a winner take all, zero sum proposition – Kashmir presents a particularly difficult case.

For India, its claim to Kashmir rests on three main arguments. First, during Partition the ruler of Kashmir “choose” India over Pakistan (albeit in distress), giving India a legal claim to the territory. Second, retaining control over Kashmir is essential to India’s identity as a secular democracy, which can accommodate different ethnic and religious groups across a wide geographic area. And third, if India lost control of Kashmir, it would encourage separatist movements across the country.

Pakistan counters that India’s claim is illegitimate because, as a Muslim country established for Muslims, Pakistan should control a region like Kashmir that is predominantly Muslim and that culturally shares more with what is now Pakistan than it does with India. Moreover, Pakistan refutes India’s claim to Kashmir on the grounds that India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru promised Kashmir a UN administered plebiscite in 1956. This promise was not kept, denying Kashmir the right to self-determination.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, Kashmir isn’t going anywhere. India has 500,000 soldiers in the region, and withstood a brutal insurgency in the 80s and 90s to retain control. Pakistan also lacks the military prowess to coerce India into ceding Kashmir, as evidenced by the wars Pakistan (largely) fought and lost in a bid to coerce India into making any substantive concessions on the issue.

Unfortunately for everyone else, Pakistan is unwilling to accept this reality. One of the few issues that a majority of Pakistanis rally around is Kashmiri independence. Adopting an unyielding stance on Kashmir helps tap into this popular support. However, the real problem stems from the Pakistani defense and intelligence establishment, and their terrorist proxies, exemplified by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

In her recent book Fighting to the End (The Pakistan Army’s Way of War), C. Christine Fair of Georgetown argues that “The ‘strategic culture’ of the Pakistan army is essentially unremitting hostility against India. The Pakistan Army believes that it is locked into a permanent, existential, civilizational battle against India.”

The Pakistani defense establishment is split between those who believe India merely seeks to undermine Pakistan and its security at every turn, and those who believe India has nefarious designs to “reunify” the subcontinent. The conflict in Kashmir serves as a salient symbol of this civilizational struggle; Pakistan’s loss of Kashmir to India plays a crucial role in the narrative that casts India as a threatening, unjust, and unreliable “other.”





More importantly, since Kashmir is such a potent symbol of India’s menace, it enables the Pakistani army to justify the massive amounts of resources devoted to it, and the outsized role played by the defense establishment in Pakistani society. Terrorist organizations like the LeT, which was established (and generously patronized by the Pakistani establishment) to wage covert war against India in Kashmir, are even more dependent on the conflict in Kashmir to justify their existence. Thus, even though Pakistan will never possess Kashmir, the Pakistani defense establishment and Pakistani terrorist groups have strong psychological and material incentives to continue the conflict there.

With the elections of Modi and Sharif, it seemed that Indo-Pakistan relations might turn a corner. Sharif, who expressed his “earnest hope” in a “brighter future” between India and Pakistan made normalizing relations with India a “central plank” of his platform, and attended Modi’s inauguration. When India cancelled talks between the foreign secretaries in retaliation for Pakistani meetings with Kashmiri separatist organizations Sharif sent a box of the “choicest Pakistani mangoes” to Modi in a bid to patch things up.

Unfortunately, “mango diplomacy” could not block the Pakistani defense establishment, which had been empowered after protests forced Sharif to beg for the army’s help, which he got in return for handing it control over the country’s defense and foreign policy portfolios.

The flashpoint, of course, was Kashmir. Many analysts, including Farahnaz Ispahani, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former member of Pakistan’s parliament, argue that “[Sharif’s] moves towards better ties between India and Pakistan” angered the military and “may have resulted in the renewed clashes on the Line of Control.”

For its part, India is pursuing a “tit-for-tat” strategy, in which it is willing to cooperate if Pakistan shows the willingness, but will respond to aggression with aggression. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s defense establishment has no interest in cooperation.




The military will also use political means to stymie cooperative arrangements. For instance, while Sharif promised to extend Most Favored Nation trading status to India without preconditions, the agreement remains un-ratified; the Pakistani government now holds that India must restart a comprehensive “composite dialogue,” which includes the issue of Kashmir, before Pakistan will consider ratifying the agreement.

While populist protectionist impulses and distrust of India are partially explain this backtracking, a “substantial part of the business community, in particular small and medium sized enterprises fear being overwhelmed by cheap Indian goods.” Notably, many former Pakistani soldiers and officers own or are employed by these enterprises. Thus, the military has an incentive “protect their own” by pressuring the civilian government against ratification.

External factors also militate against movement towards a cooperative equilibrium. The NATO drawdown in Afghanistan is creating a space for increased competition between India and Pakistan, which both view Afghanistan as strategically important. Analysts also fear that the drawdown in Afghanistan will result in an influx of militants into Kashmir, something the Pakistani defense establishment may encourage, to prevent them from coming to Pakistan instead.

The recent incursion by the Pakistani military into North Waziristan pushed a variety of terrorist organizations, including the Punjabi Taliban, into Afghanistan, undoubtedly worrying India, as these organizations will work with the Afghan Taliban in their insurgency against the Indian-supported government.

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and the Islamic State also threaten to exacerbate conflict. Both groups are recruiting in Kashmir, and AQIS has threatened to launch attacks in India. Undoubtedly, increased militant activity in Kashmir, or Islamist terrorist attacks in India would deteriorate the relationship between India and Pakistan.




Glimmers of Hope

Still, there are glimmers of hope. Pakistan and India have managed to cooperate on “non-securitized,” non-zero sum issues like disaster response and energy, and the countries have made good faith efforts to deepen trade ties. India pledged relief to Pakistan after the latter’s devastating 2010 earthquake, and Pakistan reciprocated after recent floods in Indian administered Kashmir. The two countries have also discussed a proposal to share information about the level of rivers that run between the two countries to form an early warning flood system.

India and Pakistan also inked a gas sharing agreement, which encourages efforts to bind South and Central Asia together through the proposed TAPI pipeline, which would run through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. The pipeline could help alleviate Pakistan’s chronic gas shortages, which cost the country 6 percent of its GDP a year.

These areas present opportunities for small clusters of Pakistani and Indian officials, businessmen, and think-tankers to cooperate on low-profile issues, and discuss the benefits of, and terms for, deeper cooperation on more substantive issues. Small wins in Track II diplomacy settings could spill over and push India and Pakistan towards a more cooperative equilibrium. A landmark study by David Axelrod of the University of Michigan found that the introduction of small clusters of individuals committed to establishing cooperative equilibriums, with a sufficiently high expectation of cooperating again in the future, can push large groups from non-cooperative equilibriums to more cooperative ones. Why? Over time, small cooperative clusters create broader institutional change, because those who employ them are ultimately more successful than those who employ uncooperative strategies.

While a full explanation of this phenomenon requires a background in game theory and a bit of math, an oversimplified “toy model” for this context would predict that cooperation between Indians and Pakistanis on non-securitized issues would heighten expectations that the two countries would cooperate on more issues, and more frequently in the future. This would give players more of an incentive to choose cooperative strategies when interacting with their counterparts. The higher the likelihood of future cooperation, the higher the incentive to pursue cooperative strategies in the present, since pursuing an uncooperative strategy in the present would place you at a disadvantage in future interactions.

However, the parties involved must prevent nascent clusters of cooperation from becoming “securitized.” Issues of national security are traditionally viewed as “zero-sum”: One party gains from the other party’s losses. Thus, if diplomats or technocrats allow the Indian or Pakistani defense establishments to securitize issues like water sharing or energy cooperation, compromises will become that much harder to reach, as any concession will be painted as possibly undermining national security. Thus, discussions over these issues should be kept quiet (and preferably held in Track II settings like think tank symposiums) and achievements should be publicized little, if at all.

The United States could help create an environment that is more conducive to cooperation by maintaining the largest possible military presence in Afghanistan that its agreement with Kabul allows until 2016, dissuading Pakistan and India from exacerbating their competition there (at least in the short run).

While this may not end the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan, it’s imperative for the prosperity and stability of the region that opportunities for cooperation be pursued further. The most pressing issue is climate change, a transnational threat that requires transnational responses. For instance, Pakistan’s water supply is expected to shrink by 30 percent over the next 20 years, while its population is projected to nearly double by 2050. This could severely strain the vital Indus Water Treaty, which governs water sharing between the two countries. India also stands to gain through greater cooperation: Climate change threatens to wipe out 8.7 percent of India’s GDP through an increase in floods and droughts unless adaptation and mitigation measures are taken. India could become more resilient to floods by sharing river level information with Pakistan to form an early warning system, and by discussing best practices for making land and communities more resilient to climate change. The two countries could also jointly lobby major powers to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions further.

While traditional overtures between India and Pakistan may not help the relationship, discreet and adept diplomacy between NGOs and technocrats on non-securitized issues like energy, humanitarian operations, climate change, and trade could establish patterns of cooperation that steer Pakistan and India towards a less antagonistic, more cooperative, strategic equilibrium.

Source:thediplomat.com/